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Abstract: The cross-country literature on foreign aid effectiveness has relied on the use of instruments to 
distinguish causality from mere correlation. This paper uses simple non-instrumental techniques in the 
spirit of Granger to demonstrate that the main aid-growth connection is a negative causal relationship 
from growth to aid—aid, that is, as a fraction of recipient GDP. Coarsely, when GDP goes up, aid/GDP 
goes down. The endogeneity of aid, long suspected, is real. Less understood is that adding certain com-
mon controls to regressions puts this relationship through the looking glass, flipping both its sign and ap-
parent direction: aid seems to cause growth. Ideally, instrumentation expunges the endogeneity shown 
here. In practice, estimates of aid’s impact have run into problems. Autocorrelation in the errors is wide-
spread, and can render endogenous lagged variables used as regressors or instruments. The pitfalls of 
“difference” and “system” include invalidity and proliferation of instruments. Multicollinearity in term 
pairs of interest, such as aid and aid
2 or “project” and “program” aid, can amplify endogeneity bias. The 
combination of specification problems and widespread fragility (shown in earlier work) leads to pessi-
mism about the ability of cross-country econometrics to demonstrate aid effectiveness. This does not rule 
an average positive effect, nor does it contradict the fact that aid has saved millions of lives, but it does 
suggest that the average effect on economic growth is too small to be detected statistically.
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It has been just over ten years since World Bank researchers David Dollar and Craig Burnside 
disseminated in a working paper the electrifying finding that foreign aid raises economic growth 
in countries with good economic policies. Since then, the aid community has become somewhat 
enamored of cross-country aid-growth regressions, then somewhat less so. But to this day, stud-
ies of the type remain influential. Practitioners in the $80 billion-a-year aid enterprise care about 
their work and hanker for objective and persuasive evidence that they are helping.
3 There are po-
litical pressures for the same. Cross-country regressions have promised to meet the need in grand 
fashion by looking at aid as a whole across the universe of poorer countries. 
On a pessimistic note, Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) and Roodman (2007a) 
show that fragility is widespread in the contemporary aid-growth econometric literature—the 
first finds it in Burnside and Dollar (BD, 2000) and the second in six more studies. However, the 
present paper makes the case that it would be wrong to dismiss the entire literature as fragile. 
Some studies have found robust, positive associations between aid and growth—at least certain 
kinds of aid, or in certain kinds of countries. 
Here, we argue that reported associations between aid and growth are indeed more than 
noise filtered by publication bias. There is a clear aid-growth relationship in the four- or five-
year timeframes normally studied in aid-growth panel regressions. But instead of being positive 
and running causally from aid to growth, it is negative and runs from growth to aid—aid, that is, 
as it is usually measured, as a fraction of recipient gross domestic product (GDP). Coarsely, 
when GDP goes up, aid/GDP goes down. More precisely, the short-term elasticity of a recipi-
ent’s total aid with respect to its GDP is less than 1, so that the short-term elasticity of aid/GDP 
with respect to GDP (and GDP/capita) is negative. 
                                                 
3 Figure is for Net Aid Transfers from traditional donors in 2005 (Roodman 2006a). Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
 2 
The possibility of reverse causation from growth to aid is not news, though clear demon-
strations are rare. What seems little appreciated is that adding certain common controls to regres-
sions of growth on aid can put this negative link from growth to aid/GDP through the looking 
glass, making it look like a positive link flowing causally from aid to growth. This paper argues 
that that is happening, and explains how. 
Having demonstrated that the dominant statistical relationship between and aid and 
growth is endogenous (to growth), the paper then discusses a number of common specification 
problems that have undermined attempts to eliminate such endogeneity through instrumentation. 
These include autocorrelation, instrument proliferation, and multicollinearity. The paper con-
cludes by positing that some of these specification difficulties are arising inevitably as research-
ers strive against limits to what econometrics can glean from the data. This does not rule out an 
average positive effect of aid, nor does it contradict the fact that aid has saved millions of lives. 
But it does suggest that the average effect on economic growth is too small to be detected statis-
tically. 
1.  The sign flip 
1.1.  A small mystery 
Especially since the mid-1990s, fear of endogeneity has shaped the aid-growth literature, leading 
to routine use of instrumental variables estimators. However, the nature of that endogeneity—its 
sign, strength, and causality—has been little explored. In this section, we perform some simple 
regressions in the spirit of Granger causality testing in order to investigate the endogeneity. In 
the process, we unearth an odd pattern. 
  For the sake of an example, we adapt the preferred 2SLS regression in Hansen and Tarp 
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to argue that aid works on average, albeit with diminishing returns.
4 In this specification, HT re-
gress per-capita economic growth on recipient’s aid/GDP and (aid/GDP)
2 in a panel that covers 
1974–93 with four-year periods. They copy Burnside and Dollar’s controls but introduce differ-
ent instruments, which are the one-period lags of aid/GDP, its square, the BD economic policy 
index, and quadratic and cubic terms involving these.
5 To fit this regression into the simple OLS 
approach taken here, we discard the instrumented variables, aid/GDP and (aid/GDP)
2, and bring 
some or all of the instruments into the regressor list in their place. OLS regressions on these vari-
ables are valid under essentially the same assumptions as the original. 
Table 1 exhibits the pattern of interest. The first panel shows the results of regressing 
growth solely on aid/GDP and (aid/GDP)
2, with no other controls, using the original HT data set. 
Column 1 in the panel corresponds most closely to the original HT regression in that in regresses 
on lagged aid/GDP and (aid/GDP)
2, which are instruments in the HT regression. The second and 
third columns instead regress on current or future observations of the two aid variables. This 
change looks strange within HT’s analytical framework—HT make no claim that current or fu-
ture aid is exogenous to growth—but is akin to a Sims (1972) causality test for causality from 
growth to aid. (A proper Sims test is below.) The coefficient on the linear aid variable is negative 
throughout, with the largest coefficient and smallest standard error in the forward-observations 
regression. 
For the second panel of Table 1, we include the full set of HT exogenous variables—
regressors and excluded instruments—as controls. In the first column, the coefficient on aid/GDP 
                                                 
4 Regression 1.2 in HT (2001). HT’s overall preferred specification is rather different, using difference GMM. 
5 The controls are: log initial GDP/capita; assassinations/capita, ethnic fractionalization in 1960, and their product; 
dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and fast-growing East Asia; money supply/GDP, lagged; the ICRG governance 
variable; and period dummies. Instead of entering Burnside and Dollar’s economic policy index as a control, they 
enter its underlying variables: inflation, budget surplus/GDP, and Sachs-Warner openness. The instruments are the 
one-period lags of aid/GDP, (aid/GDP)
2, policy, policy
2, log population×policy, log initial GDP/capita×policy, (log 
initial GDP/capita)
2×policy, aid/GDP×policy, and (aid/GDP)
2×policy. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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is now significant, positive, and close to the 0.241 in HT’s 2SLS original. This contrasts with the 
negative coefficient in the regression above it in the table. But as one scans the second panel 
from left to right, the coefficients on both aid variables change monotonically, and flip sign.
6 The 
clustered p value for the negative coefficient on forward aid/GDP is 0.12; as we will see, regress-
ing on more distant forward lags only increases the significance. 
In sum, without controls, the aid-growth relationship appears consistently negative, if 
more strongly for forward aid. Adding controls flips the sign on lagged aid. 
This pattern has a precedent. In a similar analysis, Blomström, Lipsey, and Zejan (BLZ, 
1996) use OLS to investigate causal relationships between growth and investment/GDP in a 
cross-country panel with 5-year periods. They question the conclusion of De Long and Summers 
(1991) about the importance of (equipment) investment for growth. Regressions like those above 
but substituting investment/GDP for aid/GDP produce almost exactly the same pattern—except 
with opposite signs throughout. Regressions on lagged, current, and forward investment/GDP all 
return a positive sign. Adding controls, country dummies in this case again produces a sign flip, 
putting a negative sign on lagged investment/GDP. (See Table 2.) 
In their Quarterly Journal of Economics article, BLZ do not explain the sign flip.
 What 
could? In the working paper version of their study, BLZ (1993) conjecture that it reflects heavy 
investment in the run-up to the 1982 global debt crisis, after which growth plunged. As for the 
aid-growth sign flip, one partial explanation is that HT are right about the meaning of the posi-
tive coefficients on lagged aid with controls: aid works, with diminishing returns. Some other 
story must then explain the negative coefficients on the right side of Table 1. Perhaps donors 
                                                 
6 In the regression for the second panel, the same shift—from lagged to current to forward—is applied to all the 
variables whose lags are instruments in the original HT regression. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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view countries that have recently achieved strong economic growth as less needy, and so give 
them less aid. 
But these theories are rather complicated and ad hoc. And they do not explain the striking 
anti-symmetry between the aid and investment results, nor the consistently negative coefficients 
on aid when there are no controls. The overall pattern is elegant. It transcends the choice of re-
gressor. Something mathematical appears to be at work. 
1.2. More  evidence 
Before offering a unified theory, we report results from a fuller set of tests of the causal relation-
ships between aid and growth, copying and augmenting the BLZ framework. 
First, we expand Table 1. For statistical power, this time we work on a much larger data 
set than in the HT study, covering 1962–2001, again with four-year periods. But for simpler and 
less arbitrary tests, we hew closely to the BLZ model, dispensing with the quadratic aid term and 
HT’s complex control set. The first row in Table 3 regresses growth on the change in aid/GDP, 
without controls, in order to investigate temporal relationships between shocks to aid/GDP and 
shocks to GDP/capita. It shows a generally negative relationship, strongest for current and for-
ward changes in aid/GDP. This suggests that growth negatively Granger-causes aid, with an ef-
fect that persists for at least one four-year period. The second row, like the first of Table 1, re-
gresses growth on aid/GDP in levels rather than differences. Again, the coefficients start at es-
sentially zero on the left and slide negative toward the right. But here, since aid/GDP in levels is 
an accumulation of past innovations, growth shocks in the current period leave traces in aid/GDP 
far into the future: the coefficient declines monotonically from left to right and gains signifi-
cance. The third row of Table 3 copies BLZ in introducing country dummies into the regression 
on aid/GDP in levels. The coefficients on the once- and twice-lags of aid/GDP now become Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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markedly positive, at 1.1–1.7 standard errors above zero: there is a sign flip. If we instead control 
for period-initial GDP/capita (bottom row), there is some evidence of a sign flip, though this 
time the coefficients are only half a standard error north of 0. 
In all the regressions on aid/GDP in levels, the strongest coefficients continue to appear 
on the most forward observations of the aid variable. As BLZ argue for the case of investment, 
this pattern suggests that the best model of the aid-growth relationship puts aid after growth. The 
positive coefficients on lagged aid/GDP in the presence of the controls are not as strong as with 
Table 1’s quadratic aid term and full control set, though reasonably strong with country dum-
mies. The weakness of the positive coefficients on lagged aid, next to the continuing strength of 
those on forward aid, suggest that whatever is at work behind the sign flip is second-order and 
indirect, perhaps an artifact of the first-order causality from growth to aid. 
These tests show that the dominant aid-growth link runs temporally from growth to aid. 
But they do not rule out causation the other way. For a more formal examination of causality in 
both directions, we perform Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) tests (see Table 4), which are rare 
in the aid-growth literature.
7 They paint a clear picture of Granger causality from growth to aid 
but not vice versa. Again sticking to the BLZ specifications, we set the lag limits involved to two 
periods.
 In the Sims tests, we include lags of the dependent variable to reduce serial correlation 
in the errors.
8 F tests of the joint significance of the terms of interest are at the bottom of the ta-
ble. In the Granger tests, lagged observations of aid/GDP add no explanatory power to a regres-
sion of growth on its own lags. But lagged growth does help predict aid/GDP even controlling 
                                                 
7 One example is Arvin and Barillas (2002), who find no overall relationship in either direction between aid/GNP 
and GNP/capita but do find positive causality from aid/GNP to GNP/capita and negative causality from GNP/capita 
to aid/GNP in Latin America and the Caribbean, and positive causality from GNP/capita to aid/GNP in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
8 Simulation results in Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1983) favor causality tests with the two structures used here and 
in BLZ. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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for its own lags. Similarly, in the Sims tests, future aid/GDP enters significantly when added to a 
regression of growth on past values of both variables, but the reverse is not true. Here too, the 
aid-growth results match BLZ’s investment-growth results. 
1.3. An  explanation 
There is little doubt that growth negatively Granger-causes aid/GDP (and positively Granger-
causes investment/GDP). This is unremarkable, if seldom remarked. Crudely, it makes sense that 
when GDP goes up, aid/GDP goes down. More precisely, the short-term elasticity of aid with 
respect to GDP is less than unity, so that that of aid/GDP with respect to GDP (or GDP/capita) is 
negative. Whether out of inertia or policy, donors do not increase aid as fast as recipients’ 
economies grow, or reduce it as fast as they shrink.
9 In this sense, aid is counter-cyclical. Mean-
while, investment is pro-cyclical, collapsing during economic crises even more than GDP and 
rebounding quickly during recoveries. This difference between aid and investment is akin to the 
fact that Tables 1 and 2 are alike except with opposite signs throughout. 
So the outstanding question, the small mystery, is this: what explains the sign flip on 
lagged aid/GDP and investment/GDP when controls are added? Does it require major additional 
assumptions about the real world? Or is there some parsimonious premise about the data generat-
ing process that suffices? 
There is. Consider a growth regression on aid/GDP and country dummies. For intuition, 
imagine we observe Country A and Country B at period t. We translate the conditioning on 
country dummies into an assumption about this scenario by assuming that the two countries grow 
the same in total over the study period. Now suppose that in period t – 1, Country A receives 
more aid/GDP that Country B. All else equal, since aid/GDP contains information about a coun-
                                                 
9 Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell (1987, Table 4) report point estimates for the elasticity of aid/GNP to GNP of –0.59 
and –0.93. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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try’s growth history, encoded with opposite sign, higher aid/GDP for A indicates a worse growth 
record through t – 1. Implicit here is an assumption about the initial conditions: that the differ-
ence between A’s and B’s GDP/capita at the start of the study period is zero—or, more gener-
ally, expected to be zero because the initial levels are not correlated with subsequent innovations 
in aid and growth. If A grows less than B through t – 1, yet grows the same over the study pe-
riod, then A must grow faster after t – 1, leading us to expect higher growth at t in particular. 
Thus can higher aid/GDP in the past precede and appear to cause higher growth now. That is the 
sign flip. Much the same story can be told for investment/GDP, except that higher invest-
ment/GDP at t – 1 indicates a stronger growth record up to then and predicts lower growth there-
after. 
The mental exercise for a regression that controls for initial GDP/capita instead of coun-
try dummies is more complicated, in an interesting way. The change in controls leads us to as-
sume that A and B, instead of growing the same amount over the study period, have the same 
GDP/capita at the beginning of period t. Again, A has higher aid/GDP during period t – 1, thus 
lower growth previous to then. If A, by assumption, catches up to B in GDP/capita by the end of 
t – 1 despite a generally weaker growth history, then it must experience a growth spurt during t – 
1. If we then adduce a new assumption, of positive serial correlation in growth innovations, that 
raises the expectation of growth in period t. Because this statistical argument involves a step not 
needed in the fixed effects scenario, from growth in t – 1 to growth in t, the correlation between 
lagged aid/GDP and growth should be weaker in this scenario, as we find it to be. 
The general principle is this: If y Granger-causes x, simple and partial correlations of y 
with past x can have opposite signs if the partial correlation is conditioned on controls that con-
tain information about y-history subsequent to the observation of the past x. Whether this phe-Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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nomenon occurs asymptotically depends on the nature of any Granger causality from x to y, the 
correlation structure of the innovations in x and y, the initial conditions, and the exact controls. 
The Appendix formally demonstrates the effect for the two scenarios just described. Although 
our concrete examples of x are “something over GDP,” i.e., computed as a ratio whose denomi-
nator is tightly linked to y, this is not necessary for the looking-glass effect.
10 All that is needed is 
a clearly signed marginal elasticity between x and y. It could just as well happen with inflation, 
say, or credit to private entities as a fraction of total credit. 
In a sense, this carefully motivated and developed argument simply illustrates the general 
principle that conditional and unconditional covariances mean different things. 
Some blend of the two scenarios out offers a plausible model for many aid-growth re-
gressions. The HT regression we started with, for instance, includes dummies for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and fast-growing East Asia, initial GDP/capita, inflation, and budget surplus/GDP, all of 
which contain information about growth history. Meanwhile, it appears that most such regres-
sions are serially correlated. Easterly et al. (1993) and Pritchett (2000) emphasize the volatility 
of growth in developing countries over the long term. But there is a persistent short-term compo-
nent too—think of China, which has grown year after year, defying the expectations of many, or 
African countries that have not grown, year after year, defying the hopes of many. This persis-
tence, more precisely our inability to explain all of it with conditioning variables, creates a seri-
ally correlated error component in many 4- and 5-year panel growth regressions. Below, I find a 
coefficient of correlation in the errors of 0.1–0.2 in aid-growth regressions. 
In sum, worries about the endogeneity of aid to growth, dating back at least to Mosley 
(1980), are well-founded. Underappreciated though is the precise nature of this endogeneity and 
                                                 
10 Here, we elide the distinction between GDP and GDP/capita, which is what y really is. But shocks to the two are 
highly correlated. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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how common controls can give it the appearance of a positive aid-to-growth link. An early ex-
ample may be Mosley (1980), which finds that in the poorest developing countries, contempo-
rary aid/GDP is insignificant in a growth regression—but is positive and significant once 
lagged.
11 Such findings can be robust since they arise from real statistical relationships. 
2.  Specification issues in the aid-growth literature 
The simple tests reported here imply that the dominant aid-growth relationship is not a positive 
one running from aid/GDP to growth but a negative one going the other way. They do not com-
pletely rule out aid affecting growth but do show that any such effect is statistically weak. That 
places a heavy burden on instrumentation strategies. Invalid instruments will pick up the causa-
tion from growth to aid. Weak instruments will pick up about as much of that as they will the 
reverse. As we have seen, where instrumentation falls short, reverse causation can not only ob-
scure positive results of interest to researchers but generate them. 
This section reviews some common specification issues in the aid-growth literature that 
hamper researchers’ ability to remove the reverse causation. Two, autocorrelation and instrument 
proliferation, go directly to the question of instrument validity in some studies. The third is mul-
ticollinearity, which under certain plausible assumptions increases the sensitivity of regressions 
to endogeneity. 
2.1. Autocorrelation 
Serial correlation in the errors is prevalent in the pooled OLS and 2SLS regressions in this litera-
ture. One reason it is rarely reported may be that extreme growth volatility in oil-rich countries 
such as Iran or conflict-ridden ones such as Sudan obscures the general pattern, foiling standard 
autocorrelation tests. Table 5 shows that one can greatly increase the power of an autocorrelation 
                                                 
11 Likewise, the OLS regressions on lagged aid in the Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) working paper, like 
the HT regressions in text, exhibit a sign flip if forward aid is used instead. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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test by applying the Hadi (1992) outlier-identification procedure to a scatter of estimation residu-
als against their own lags, then excluding them from the test sample. For instance, the Arellano-
Bond (1991) test for first-order serial correlation returns a p value of 0.54 for Burnside and Dol-
lar’s (2000) preferred specification. But excluding nine outliers drops it to 0.15. (Researchers 
commonly dismiss such p values as above conventional thresholds, but conservatism argues for 
high thresholds on such tests, not low ones.)  
Autocorrelation can cause endogeneity bias when, in attempts to eliminate endogeneity, 
variables of interest are lagged in OLS regressions (Hadjimichael et al. 1995) or instrumented 
with their own lags (HT and Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004)). If lagged aid is endoge-
nous to lagged growth and the lagged growth innovation is correlated with the contemporary 
one, then lagged aid can be correlated with it too.
12 To indicate the degree of autocorrelation, the 
table also reports serial correlation coefficients for the restricted samples, which should be taken 
as suggestive to the extent that the regressions on which they are based are biased by the autocor-
relation itself. 
2.2. Instrument  proliferation 
The “difference” and “system” GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998) dominate the most recent aid-growth literature (Dalgaard, Han-
sen, and Tarp 2004; Bobba and Powell 2007; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2006; Mishra 
and Newhouse 2007; Rajan and Subramanian forthcoming), in part because of the availability of 
the “xtabond2” program for Stata (Roodman 2006b). The instrumentation strategies used in 
many of these studies raise several concerns. 
                                                 
12 Dropping the lags of aid and aid
2 from the instrument sets in the 2SLS regressions in HT and Clemens, Radelet, 
and Bhavnani (2004) eliminates the significance of the coefficients on the aid terms. So identification appears to 
depend on these suspect instruments. 
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As typically used, the estimators generate instruments whose number is quadratic in the 
time dimension of the study panel. Instrument proliferation creates the risk of overfitting of en-
dogenous variables. It also vitiates the Hansen J test for joint instrument validity (Bowsher 2002; 
Roodman 2007b). Thus if instrument proliferation is not stopped, the estimators can be expected 
to generate results that are simultaneously invalid and sport the appearance of validity. In addi-
tion, the assumptions necessary for the validity of the individual instruments for the levels equa-
tion in system GMM, spelled out in Blundell and Bond (1998), are non-trivial. They can be 
checked with difference-in-Hansen tests, but rarely are, at least in specifications in which the in-
strument collection has been curtailed to protect the power of the tests. 
For example, in Michaelowa and Weber (2006) the significance of the aid term appears 
to go hand-in-hand with the instrument count. Mishra and Newhouse (2007)’s system GMM re-
gressions estimate the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable to be almost exactly 1.0, a 
value at which the system GMM instruments are invalid (Blundell and Bond 1998). Dalgaard, 
Hansen, and Tarp (2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (forthcoming) rely on GMM regressions in 
which instruments rival observations in number. Both report that shrinking the instrument collec-
tion does not affect their results. Still, they illustrate that problematic practices have been the 
norm. 
2.3. Multicollinearity 
Textbooks typically warn that multicollinearity inflates the variance of OLS (e.g., Greene 2000, 
p. 256). This is easy to understand: nearly identical variables are hard to distinguish. But regres-
sions with collinearity can in fact return statistically strong results (Spanos and McGuirk 2002). 
The intuition comes from basic econometrics. By the Frisch-Waugh Theorem, only the unique 
variation in a regressor helps identify its OLS coefficient. If the regressor is nearly multicollinear Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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with other variables, that unique variation is small; if that unique variation is nevertheless 
strongly correlated with the dependent variable, OLS will report a significant t statistic for the 
coefficient on the variable. If one regresses daily revenue of a shoe store on left shoe and right 
shoe sales, and an extra right shoe is recorded as being sold on a day of strong revenue, OLS will 
put a significant positive coefficient on right-shoe sales and nearly the same coefficient and t sta-
tistic on left-shoe sales—but with opposite sign. In contrast, regressing on either variable alone 
will return little significance. Thus near-collinearity can enhance the power of regressions to de-
tect relationships involving small subcomponents of variables, a sort of “corona effect,” analo-
gous to the way the moon’s transit across the nearly collinear sun during an eclipse reveals the 
sun’s corona. 
The principle of course carries over to more sophisticated estimators in the GMM class. 
So, at the least, multicollinearity in variables of interest means that identification of their coeffi-
cients is driven by small components of variation within them. These components may be asso-
ciated with specific observations—outliers—or they may be diffuse. If diffuse, the possibility 
remains, as with outliers, that the variation spotlighted represents a structural break in the data-
generating process, and is therefore unrepresentative of the full sample. 
Near-multicollinearity appears common in the aid literature starting in the late 1990s. In 
the 2SLS HT regression referred to in section 1, I find that the variance inflation factor (VIF) for 
aid/GDP, after projecting the endogenous variables onto instruments, is 8.6: instrumented 
aid/GDP is correlated  94 . 0 6 . 8 1 1 = − with its projection onto the other regressors.
13 The main 
source of collinearity is (aid/GDP)
2. This is because aid/GDP has largely positive support and is 
right-skewed, and because projecting the two aid variables onto a common set of instruments 
                                                 
13 The VIF is 1/(1 – R
2), where the R
2 is for a regression of the variable on all the other right-hand-side variables. In 
a regression with two variables on the right, it is the same for both.  Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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reduces unique variation in them. Given the probable invalidity of the instruments in HT, based 
on lags of the instrumented variables, this near-multicollinearity may be helping to detect an en-
dogenous relationship. Multicollinearity is most likely present in all aid-growth studies that in-
clude aid/GDP and (aid/GDP)
2 (Hadjimichael et al. 1995; Durbarry, Gemmell, and Greenaway 
1998; Lensink and White 2001; Hudson and Mosley 2001; Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani 
2004; Collier and Dollar 2004; Ali and Isse 2005). 
And the potential for multicollinearity is not confined to these studies of diminishing re-
turns to aid. Since Burnside and Dollar (2000), it has become common to interact aid with other 
terms, split aid into subcomponents, or introduce new terms that are inherently correlated with 
aid/GDP. All of these practices can generate near-multicollinear pairs. Burnside and Dollar inter-
act aid and aid
2 with policy. Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) interact aid with the fraction of a 
country’s area that is in the tropics. Other studies split aid into bilateral flows (from national 
governments) and multilateral flows (from the World Bank and other international agencies) 
(Ram 2004); technical assistance and non-technical assistance (Chauvet and Collier 2006); pro-
ject aid and program aid (Cordella and Dell’Ariccia 2003; Ouattara and Stroble 2004); “produc-
tive” and “unproductive” aid (Neanidis and Varvarigos 2007); and aid that appears geopolitically 
motivated and aid that does not (Reddy and Minoui 2006; Bobba and Powell 2007). Still others 
have regressed simultaneously on aid/GDP and a measure of aid instability or unpredictability 
that tends to scale with aid/GDP (Lensink and Morrissey 2001; Neanidis and Varvarigos 2007). 
Frequently both variables in the constructed pairs are highly significant with opposite sign, just 
as in our Table 1. Some of the coefficient magnitudes stretch credulity. Few of the studies report 
testing the variables of interest individually; Hudson and Mosley (2001) and Bobba and Powell 
(2007) are exceptions. Figure 1 shows the recurring pattern. Scanning the figure, it is hard to es-Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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cape the suspicion that regressions on two collinear aid terms have an inherent propensity to 
generate seemingly strong results, which is amplified by systemic tendencies (however uncon-
scious) toward data mining and publication bias. 
The effects of multicollinearity are complex and context-dependent. This section offers 
two illustrations and a bit of theory about how it can interact with endogeneity. First, we turn to 
the Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (ELR, 2004) testing of Burnside and Dollar (2000). Table 6 
is an expanded version of one in ELR, showing sample-expansion tests of the BD OLS regres-
sions that include both aid/GDP×policy and (aid/GDP)
2×policy. In the original BD regressions 
(first panel of Table 6) the two variables enter with opposite signs and similar t statistics. And 
they are nearly multicollinear, as indicated by the VIFs. But the coefficients jump around as the 
sample changes in subsequent panels. ELR survey these results and declare the BD results frag-
ile. However, the numbers are not pure noise. The two variables always enter with opposite sign 
and similar t statistics. And the t statistics are generally too strong to be caused by chance alone. 
But the sign on aid/GDP×policy is not stable. If one eliminates the collinearity by dropping 
(aid/GDP)
2×policy, the large t statistics disappear throughout (results not shown). Thus the col-
linearity seems to make the estimator’s true variance large, as the textbooks predicts, but making 
the reported variance small, as Spanos and McGuirk (2002) show is possible. 
The second example is a regression in Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (DHT, 2004). To the 
ELR dataset, DHT adduce a variable that is the fraction of a country’s area that is in the tropics. 
For most countries, it is 0 or 1. Tropical location surfaces as a growth determinant in Gallup and 
Sachs (1999) and Sachs (2001, 2003). The causal channels may involve institutions and eco-
nomic policies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003). In DHT’s 
growth regressions, aid and aid×tropical area fraction are quite significant, with nearly equal and Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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opposite signs, so that the derivative of growth with respect to aid in the tropics is not statisti-
cally different from 0. On average, aid seems to work outside the tropics but not in them.
14 
To give a sense of the data behind this result, Figure 2 shows the scatter plot of aid/GDP 
and aid/GDP×tropical area fraction in the DHT sample. For countries fully within the tropics, the 
two variables coincide. And most countries outside the tropics have received relatively little aid 
for their economic size so aid/GDP and aid/GDP×tropical area fraction are both small. As a con-
sequence, the identification of the aid-tropics interaction derives mainly from the handful of non-
tropical, heavily aided countries. Jordan stands out on the graph, but Egypt and Syria, and, to a 
lesser extent, Botswana, help make up the corona too. (Thirty percent of Botswana lies outside 
the tropics.) Table 7 shows that dropping either aid variable from a representative DHT regres-
sion greatly weakens the coefficient on the other. Leaving both in but excluding the four main 
corona countries from the sample eliminates the result.
15 
Aid may well have raised growth in the main corona countries. But other stories are plau-
sible too. In the oil boom years of the 1970s and 1980s, Jordan received 5–15% of GDP in aid, 
mostly from other Middle Eastern nations, which could have provided short-term stimulus by 
bringing excess production factors into play. But regional economic linkages probably also fig-
ured in the temporary growth spurt. Jordan’s Port of Aqaba is an important transshipment point 
for oil, for example. At any rate, such cases deserve close examination. But the purpose of 
                                                 
14 Roodman (2007a) tests the DHT system GMM regression for fragility. Unlike the other six test subjects, the DHT 
regression comes through almost all tests with flying colors. A deficiency in the working paper version of Roodman 
(2007a), however, is that it does not subject GMM regressions (those of DHT and Hansen and Tarp 2001) to re-
moval of outliers. The hindrance was that the partial scatter, the basis for the outlier search in that paper, is not well 
defined for GMM. The published version overcomes this hindrance by running a parallel 2SLS regression, identify-
ing outliers from it in the usual way, then re-running the GMM regression excluding these outliers. 
15 The original is regression 5 of their Table 3, using system GMM. The reproduction here in column 1 of Table 7 
differs from the original in sample size. The original was executed with the DPD for Ox package (Doornik, 
Arellano, and Bond 2002). It turns out that an assumption built into this software—incomplete observations that 
create gaps in the time series must always be included in the data file rather than deleted—led the program to break 
time series for countries with gaps into two or more separate series. The xtabond2 module for Stata (Roodman 
2006b), used here, does not behave this way. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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econometric analysis is to abstract from idiosyncrasies, searching for patterns in large numbers 
of observations. Multicollinearity is a sign that the opposite may be happening, that strong idio-
syncrasies are being mistaken for general patterns. 
Beyond this general concern, under plausible circumstances multicollinearity can be 
shown to magnify endogeneity bias—in theory and in simulations. Separate research is develop-
ing this analysis more fully. Suppose aid/GDP has a small endogenous component. In a regres-
sion on aid/GDP and typical controls, endogeneity could be technically present but a minor con-
cern. But adding a second, nearly collinear, term, such as (aid/GDP)
2, greatly shrinks the unique 
variation in aid/GDP, and can do so such that the endogenous component becomes large within 
it. In particular, if aid/GDP consists of a large lognormal component unrelated to growth and 
small (endogenous) one linearly related to it, adding (aid/GDP)
2 to a simple regression of growth 
on aid/GDP allows a much better fit, in which the endogenous component moves to the fore 
within the corona. Adding (aid/GDP)
2 works out to multiply the reported coefficient and vari-
ance on aid/GDP by approximately the VIF. This inflates the t statistic on aid/GDP by 
about VIF . Thus, adding the quadratic term increases the power to detect a real relationship, 
albeit linear and endogenous. In this way, multicollinearity can interact with the demonstrated 
endogeneity in the aid-growth relationship to produce more dramatic, yet invalid, results. 
3. Conclusion 
There appear to be almost no findings in the contemporary literature that a) find a significant ef-
fect of aid on growth, b) are robust, and c) are free of the methodological problems described 
here. The technical problems pointed out here may admit technical solutions, such as replacing 
aid/GDP with aid/capita. But given the prevalence of specification problems and fragility in this 
literature, some may be surface manifestations of deeper, less mutable problems. Prevalent auto-Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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correlation may be a sign of our continuing inability to fully explain cross-country differences in 
growth—why China keeps growing fast and Niger keeps not growing fast. That in turn hampers 
our ability to exploit within-country variation by, roughly speaking, treating successive periods 
in a country as independent experiments. Multicollinearity arises out of attempts to address sta-
tistically second-order but practical questions of which kinds of aid raise growth when and 
where. But if aid is a minor ingredient in the complex processes of economic growth, if it is often 
ineffective, and if the available datasets are small and marred by measurement error, even an-
swering the first-order question of whether it works on average is challenging. 
In reviewing the 50-year history of this literature, McGillivray et al. (2005) identify a 
structural break in the late 1990s, with Burnside and Dollar (2000). Before then, there is no con-
sensus about the first-order effects of aid. After, “practically all studies…conclude that aid is as-
sociated with higher growth, one way or another.” What happened? The biggest change was the 
increase in econometric sophistication, moving from cross-sections to panels; from OLS to 2SLS 
and GMM; and from a single, linear aid regressor to interaction terms and aid subcomponents. 
The present analysis suggests that this sophistication has backfired, clouding rather than sharpen-
ing our vision. The implications for the practice of econometrics generally are worth pondering. 
This is almost certainly not the end of the econometric quest for evidence on aid effec-
tiveness. The future of the research appears to lie in asking smaller questions, and perhaps in per-
forming experiments. Chen, Mu, and Ravaillon (2006), for example, study how much the place-
ment of World Bank–financed rural development projects in China can explain sub-national 
variation in household income ten years later. Whether the new cycle of investigation will bear 
more fruit than the last remains to be seen. But clear, reassuring evidence of the overall effect of 
aid on growth does not appear forthcoming. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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Table 1. Varying lag distance and direction in OLS regressions on Hansen and 
Tarp (2001) exogenous variables 
 
 
Table 2. Regressions of GDP/capita growth on investment/GDP 
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Table 3. Coefficient on Net ODA/GDP when varying lag distance and controls in 
OLS growth regressions 
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Table 4. Granger and Sims causality tests, GDP/capita growth, Net ODA 
 
 
 Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
 22 
Table 5. Examples of serial correlation in the errors of aid-growth regressions 
 
     Arellano-Bond  test 
Study 
Representative 













Burnside & Dollar 
(2000)  5/OLS 
All low- and middle-income 











Hansen & Tarp 
(2001)  1.2  2SLS; includes aid
2 but not 
aid×policy  0.74 
Cameroon 1982–85; 
Ethiopia 1986–89; Gabon 
1978–81, 1982–85; Nica-
ragua 1978–81, 1982–85 
0.02 0.20 
Collier & Dollar 
(2002)  Table 1, col. 2 
OLS; includes aid
2 and 
aid×policy but not aid; as 
revised in Collier & Hoef-
fler (2004) 
0.62  Gabon 1978–81; Togo 




Table 4, col. 5  2SLS; excluding 4 outliers; 
full control set  0.03  Iran 1982–85; Togo 
1994–97  0.002 0.19 
All tests based on reproduction regressions on original data sets. Reproduction is exact for Burnside & Dollar and close for the others. The 
Arellano-Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation is run on the full sample for each regressions, and after excluding residuals in a scatter plot of the 
residuals against their own lags, identified using the Hadi (1992) procedure and a threshold p value of 0.1. Reported serial correlations are biased 
if original regressions are invalidated by that correlation. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
 23 























Sources, in order: Durbarry, Gemmell, and Greenaway 1998; Lensink and White 2001; Hudson and 
Mosley 2001; Collier and Dollar 2004; Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004; Ali and Isse 2005; Ouattara and 
Strobl 2004; Reddy and Minoui 2006; Chauvet and Collier 2006; Neanidis and Varvarigos 2007. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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Table 6. Easterly, Levine, and Roodman testing of Burnside & Dollar OLS regres-
sions that include aid
2×policy 
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Figure 2. Aid/GDP vs. Aid/GDP×tropical area fraction, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 
(2004) dataset 
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Table 7. Tests of regression 5, Table 3, of Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004)
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Appendix. Formal demonstration of sign flip for two cases 
This appendix defines two models in which unconditional and conditional covariances between 
two variables, one Granger-causing the other, can have opposite signs. The two correspond to the 
regressions in section 1.2 on aid/GDP or investment/GDP that control for country dummies or 
initial GDP/capita. In the first model, the controls consist of fixed effect dummies and all innova-
tions in the variables are i.i.d. In the second, the control set is the analog of initial GDP/capita, 
and growth innovations are autocorrelated in a simple way. 
Controlling for fixed-effect dummies, i.i.d. innovations 
The two variables of interest are x and y, both I(1) for each individual in a panel. y Granger-
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where i and t index observations in the panel N × T panel, L is the lag operator, and () L φ = 
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2 1 0 L L φ φ φ + +  is a polynomial whose non-zero coefficients all have the same sign and are ab-
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Given a lag distance l, we are interested in the behavior of the OLS estimator in the large-
N limit when regressing  it y ∆  on  l t i x − , , controlling for fixed effect dummies. In particular we are 
interested in the sign of the estimated coefficient on  l t i x − , . l can be positive, zero, or negative. 
The sign of the coefficient of interest is the same as that of the covariance between  it y ∆ and l t i x − ,  
after partialling out the dummies from both the variables or, equivalently, one of the them. Par-
tialling them out demeans the variables, where the means are individual-specific. So let  i y ∆ de-
note the average of  it y ∆ over [1,T] for any given i. We study the probability limit of the empirical 
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Substituting with (1) and (2) makes this 
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By assumption (and a Law of Large Numbers) the  0 i x and the l t i w − , fall out in the limit since they 
are orthogonal to the  it u , giving 
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− ψ is understood to equal 0 if –l < 0, i.e., l > 0. Indeed, in this case—if we are regressing 




















which is non-zero and has the opposite sign from the coefficients of  ( ) L ψ . This is the sign flip. 
Because our practical interest is in regressions where the variable of interest is lagged, the 
case of l ≤ 0—regression on forward observations of x—is less importance. Nevertheless, it is 































, v o ˆ C   plim φ φ   (5)
Since the second term contains  ,... , 2 1 + + l l φ φ while the first one does not, if these coefficients are 
large enough, the whole expression can have sign opposite that of the i φ , which is not the result 
we are after. But it does not seem very realistic for the coefficients on the deep lags to dominate. 
A realistic example in which this does not happen comes if we suppose that  . 0 = ⇒ ≥ k l k φ That 
is, in the context of a regression of  it y ∆ on l t i x + , , none of the innovations in y before t af-
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The coefficients on the k φ are all positive, so we conclude that in this case a fixed-effects regres-
sion of it y ∆ on l t i x + , will report the correct sign on the relationship between y and x. 
Controlling for previous y, MA(1) innovations 
In this model, we control for the “initial level” of y instead of fixed effect dummies. This time, 
for reasons motivated in section 1.3, we assume the innovations in y are positively serially corre-
lated and in the simplest possible way, with an MA(1) structure. We also simplify () L φ  from be-
fore to a single constant (0
th-order polynomial) to keep the math manageable. And we require 
that  i i i w y x + = 0 0 φ where  i w  is a random term independent of everything else in the model. So 






























The assumption that  [] 0 E 0 = i y (where the expectation is not conditional on i) merely allows us 
to exclude the constant term from the OLS regression we study. Roodman, Through the Looking-Glass, and What OLS Found There 
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Since this model does not distinguish between period-average and period-initial values, 
the analog to “period-initial” y is 1 , − t i y . So that is what we control for. We look for a sign flip 
when regressing on x observed before 1 , − t i y , i.e., on  l t i x − , where l ≥ 2. The covariance of interest 
is between  l t i x − ,  and  it y ∆ after partialling out 1 , − t i y : 
[ ]
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[] [ ] []
[] 1 ,
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Consider first the case of l = 2. The first term above is zero because  it y ∆ , as an MA(1) se-
ries, depends only on shocks in periods t and t – 1, while  2 , − t i x  depends only on earlier shocks. In 
the second term,  [ ]
[] 1 ,
1 ,
r a ˆ V







 can be shown, by substituting with definitions in (6), to con-
verge to a strictly positive value, while  [ ] 1 , 2 , , v o ˆ C − − t i t i y x  converges to a non-zero value with the 
same sign as φ. Overall then, as before, the sign of the conditional covariance between  y ∆ and 
lagged x is opposite that of the unconditional relationship.  
For completeness, now consider the case of l = –1—regressing on forward observations 
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1 , r a ˆ V





∞ → t i
t i
N y
y . Substituting into (7), the condi-






1 0 α α α α φ α φα α α φ + + = − + , which has the same sign asφ , as 
desired. The conditional and unconditional covariances of  it y ∆ and 1 , + t i x  have the same sign. 